NOTE
CHAPTER XIII OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT: AS MAINE
GOES, SO SHOULD THE NATION*
I. INTRODUCTION**

There is a staggering number of consumer bankruptcies being filed
in the United States today. It is generally believed that this is an
unavoidable corollary to the upsurge in consumer credit, and that
consumer credit, in turn, is the bulwark of our modern economy.
Assuming the validity of these conclusions, the best method of dealing with the consumer who is unable to pay his debts remains unsettled. Unknown to many attorneys, two statutory remedies exist
under federal bankruptcy law. The first, straight bankruptcy, is widely
used; the other, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans, is essentially ignored. It is the position of this note that a substantial percentage of
straight bankruptcies could and, from the standpoint of the debtor's
best interest, should be filed as Wage Earner Plans. Furthermore, by
filing straight bankruptcies where Wage Earner Plans should be
utilized, numerous attorneys are being derelict in their duty to safeguard their clients' interest. This dereliction is a result of several
factors-lack of knowledge in the legal community about Wage
Earner Plans, fallacious conclusions as to the advantages of straight
bankruptcy, and administrative hindrances in the operation of Wage
Earner Plans. A survey of possible alternatives will demonstrate that
the Wage Earner Plan, if improved, would be the best solution to the
problem of consumer bankruptcy.
* The authors would like to express their gratitude to Referee Daniel R. Cowans
and Referee Richard E. Poulos for their comments and criticisms received during the
preparation of this note.
The authors would also like to acknowledge the cooperation of those who granted
interviews: Referee Arlene Rossi; Referee Louis Karp; Professor William T. Laube;
Trustee William Martin; and Trustee Harry Heid.
** For research data, legal sophistry is no substitute for the opinions and ideas of
the day-to-day practitioner. Therefore, in order to make this note a useful tool, the
authors solicited the views of experienced bankruptcy attorneys. One hundred and sixtyfive questionnaires, soliciting reasons for recommending either straight bankruptcy or a
Wage Earner Plan, were sent to referees for distribution in every sector of the country.
The answers to this questionnaire are not intended as authoritative documentation,
but merely as representative of general areas of agreement [hereinafter cited as San
Diego Law Review Questionnaire].
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A. Straight Bankruptcy and Chapter XIIh Discussed
Of the two remedies available to the debtor-consumer, the first, and
undeniably the easier, is a petition for a discharge in bankruptcy.1
Any person is entitled to obtain such a discharge once every six years2
provided he has not committed any one of several prohibited acts.'
Except for specific nondischargeable debts, 4 a debtor may thus rid

himself of all prior financial obligations. Unfortunately, there are
numerous repercussions attending such a discharge: continuation of
secured debts, difficulty in obtaining credit, and imposition of the
stigma of bankruptcy. Moreover, the debtor is vulnerable to creditors
for the next six years. From 1898 until the Chandler Act amendments
of 1938,8 "straight" '7 bankruptcy was the sole remedy available to the
insolvent wage earner.
Although the early bankruptcy acts stressed payment to creditors, 8
recently, this emphasis has become impractical since many personal
bankruptcies are either no-asset or nominal asset cases." Vhen bankruptcy emerged as a national problem during the depression, the
President and Congress initiated several investigations 0 which, among
other findings, indicated that wage earners had a sincere desire to pay
their debts. 1 As a result, Referee Valentine Nesbit' 2 of Birmingham,
Alabama prepared a comprehensive draft of Chapter XIIP 8 which
was enacted into law in 1938.1' The key provisions of this second
remedy sought to:
1 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1967) [discharge
in bankruptcy hereinafter referred to as straight bankruptcy].
2 Id.
8 Id.
4 Id. § 35 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1967).
5 Id. This discharge applies only to debts provable under Section 103 of the Bankruptcy Act. id. § 103 (1964).
B Ch. 1138, 64 Stat. 1113 (1950) (codified amongst sections of 11 U.S.C.).
7 See material cited note I supra.
8 In re Feinberg, 287 F. 254, 256 (E.D. Pa. 1923). See also F. GILBERT, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 1, at 5 n.11 (1927); C. NADLER, THE LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF

§ 1 (1954).
9 Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1452, 1453 (1964).
10 A brief synopsis of the Donovan Investigation of bankruptcy conditions in

New York City and the Thacker Investigation undertaken by the Justice Department
in 1930-31 appears in In re Perry, 272 F. Supp. 73, 77-80 (D.C. Me. 1967).
11 Id. at 79.
12 Referee Nesbit was a special referee appointed in 1933 to develop a rehabilitation program for wage earners in Birmingham, Alabama. Two years later, in order to

obtain the benefit of Nesbit's experience, Congressman Chandler recruited him to help
prepare the draft of Chapter XIII.
1s Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as
Chapter XIII].
14 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 930.
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(a) Grant the debtor the protection of the court and free him from
harassment (including garnishment) of creditors;
(b) Afford the debtor an opportunity to amortize his debts voluntarily by making payments out of future earnings;
(c) Enable the debtor to avoid the stigma of a straight bankruptcy
discharge;
(d) Prevent the accrual of interest on present unsecured liabilities
during the operation of the plan.15
Debtors eligible for this relief have been statutorily limited to individuals "whose principal income is derived from wages, salary or
commissions." 16 A debtor so qualified may either file an original
petition 17 or convert a pending bankruptcy 8 into a Chapter XIII,
provided that he states in the petition that he "is insolvent or unable
20
1
to pay his debts as they mature."' In addition to depositing fees,
he must file schedules setting forth a statement of affairs, a list of his
creditors, his executory contracts, and a summary of his assets and
liabilities.2 ' Subsequent to, or simultaneous with filing, the debtor
must also submit a plan, to be confirmed by the referee, making
provision for payment to his creditors.2 All claims to be included
within a Wage Earner Plan must be proved by the creditor and
allowed by the court.23 In order to protect the plan from adverse
24
creditor action, the court has the power to issue restraining orders.
Upon completion of all payments, the debtor "is entitled to be discharged from all debts except those nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act."25 If the debtor is unable to complete the plan, he may
convert to straight bankruptcy and obtain a discharge.26
There are two types of Wage Earner Plans: extension plans, 7
which provide for complete payment of all debts, and composition
15 52 REp., MIAINE STATE BAR Ass'N 136, 137-38 (1963); L. TwmNEM, GuIDE TO
WAGE EARNER PLANS UNDER CHAPTER xi OF THE BANKRUPTCY Act 11 (1968)

(soon to be published by the ABA).
16 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1964).
17 Id. § 1022 (1964).
18 Id. § 1021 (1964).
19 Id. § 1025 (1964).
20 Id. § 1024 (1964).
21 Id.,
22 Id. § 616 (1964).
28 Id. § 1044 (1964). See id.§ 103 (1964).
24 Id. § 1014 (1964).
25 Id. § 1060 (1964).
26 Id. § 1066 (1964).
27 Id. § 1023 (1964). See also C. NAD R, supra note 8, at

§

390.
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plans, 28 which schedule payment of only a percentage of the debtor's

liabilities. If otherwise feasible, an extension plan is preferable be2
cause the six-year limitation on successive filings is inapplicable.
Ultimately, the success of a Chapter XIII turns on the ability of the
wage earner to pay his debts from future earnings. For this reason it
is necessary that a plan make provision for unforeseen emergencies,
such as sickness or temporary loss of employment. 0
Chapter XIII relief is not suitable for every wage earner who qualifies under the Bankruptcy Act, for an individual capable of completing a Wage Earner Plan must have a sincere desire to honor his
debts, steady future employment, and strong family support, as well
as a responsible attitude toward future purchases of luxury goods.31
83
Voluntariness 2 is the critical factor.

B. UnderlyingEconomic Considerations
Highlighting the burgeoning number of bankruptcies filed in the
past two decades, 4 92 percent, or 191,729 of all bankruptcy petitions
in 1967 were filed by consumers. 8 Yet, it is not the present number
of consumer filings which poses a threat to the economy, but rather,
the trend which the increase in filings represents.88
28 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1023 (1964); see also C. NADLER, supra note 8,
at § 390.
29 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
80 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1046(5)
(1964) (allows petitioner to make
provisions for such contingencies).
31 D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACncE § 96 (1963).
82 Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, at 74 (1967) [hereinafter referred
to and cited as 1967 Hearings].
83 For a more detailed presentation of Chapter XIII procedures, the following

works are informative: D. CowANs, supra note 31; L. TwiNaM, supra note 15;
Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earner Plans under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,
19 Bus. L. 271 (1963).
84 See 1967 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CouRTs, ANN. REP. OF THE Dmn. (Div. oF
BANKRUPTCY AD.) V-2 [hereinafter referred to and cited as 1967 BANKRuPTCY

TABLEs]. In less than two decades bankruptcy filings have increased from 18,510 petitions filed in 1948 to 208,329 in 1967. The number of petitions filed for that period
totals 1,941,778.
85 1967 BANKRUPTCY TABLES, V-5 (table). In 1967 of the 208,329 bankruptcy
petitions, 191,729 were filed by consumers. This total represents an increase of more
than 15,000 petitions from the 175,924 filed in 1966.
36 When analyzed in terms of the population of the United States, which is now
over 200 million, THE WORLD ALMANAC 41 (1968), only 3Ao of 1% of the
American public declared bankruptcy in 1967. Perhaps, a more valid ratio, the
proportion of bankruptcy filings to the national labor force, reveals only a 1 %
minimal bankruptcy rate. But, the trend represented by the 1100% increase in bankruptcies during the 1948-1967 period is the threat to the economy. See 1967 BANI,RUPTCY TABLES, V-2 (table); Cowans, Present Bankruptcy Act Defective Changes
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The upsurge in consumer bankruptcy cannot be attributed to the
growth in population, unemployment, gross national product or expenditures. Instead, consumer credit appears to be the decisive
factor. 7 Paralleling the increase in consumer bankruptcies the extension of consumer credit has developed so vigorously as to become the
mainstay of our modern economy. 8 Clearly, consumer credit will
continue to flourish, and as a result, consumer bankruptcies can be
expected to multiply.
Surprisingly, straight bankruptcy might appear to be a boon to the
economy. Discharged of his debts, the former bankrupt is in a favorable position either to replace repossessed goods or to purchase new
Currently Proposed are Unsuitable For Dealing with Insolvent Individuals New
Solution Advocated Including Credit Counseling, 22 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 40
(1968). See generally Dolphin, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Continuing Problem, 41
REF. J. 27 (1967). In a 1964 doctoral dissertation Mr. Robert Dolphin, currently
Assistant Professor of Finance, School of Business, Florida State University, commented: "[T]he past growth rate [of consumer bankruptcy] should be viewed as a
danger signal of the development of an important problem of potentially immense
magnitude." Dolphin, Thesis Reports on Causes of Consumer Bankruptcies, 18 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 130 (1964) [hereinafter cited as DOLPHIN].
87 1967 Hearings 73, where Mr. Vern Countryman, Professor of Harvard Law
School and Chairman of the Committee on Chapter XIII and Consumer Bankruptcy
of the National Bankruptcy Conference, testified:
[T]he reason for the increase in consumer bankruptcies . . . cannot be
attributed to the increase in population, which has increased by about onethird (from 141,936,000 in 1946 to about 196,000,000 in 1966). Nor can
it be attributed to unemployment, which was 2,270,000 in 1946 and 2,875,000
in 1966 and has ranged between 1.6 and 4.7 million during the interim
period. Neither is there a direct relation between rising bankruptcies and increasing gross national product or expenditure, which has slightly more
than tripled (from $211.1 billions in 1946 to $739.6 billions in 1966).
Precipitating the dominant factor in the rise of consumer bankruptcy, Professor
Countryman continues:
o . .As reported by the Federal Reserve Board, consumer credit, exclusive
of home mortgages, has increased tenfold, from $8.38 billions in 1946 to
$94.8 billions in 1966, and so have home mortgages, from $23 billions in
1946 to $225.4 billions in 1966. When we add to this the fact that disposable
personal income after taxes has only slightly more than trebled, from $147
illions to $505.3 billions, it is apparent that consumer resources have not
kept pace with consumer credit committments.
This, it seems to me, is a pretty fair indication of the reason for the rise
in consumer and employee bankruptcies. Id. (emphasis added).
88 The assistant general counsel of J.C. Penney Company maintains that [c]redit
has contributed to the prosperity of the American economy. . . . Our consumer
industries could not operate at their present high production levels if it were not
for the mass markets created by the availability of credit." Driver, To Amend the
Bankruptcy Act to Require that Consideration Be Given to the Use of Chapter XIII,
18 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 41, 42 (1964). See generally Mahon, Preparing
Your Client for Voluntary Bankruptcy, 41 REF. J.83 (1967); Hilliard & Hurt, supra
note 33.
Statistics representing the increase in the extension of consumer credit and consumer
credit outstanding from 1956-66 are reported in 1967 Nat'l Consumer Finance Ass'n,
FINANCE FAcrs 38-41.
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luxuries. It is arguable8 9 that the resulting increase in purchasing
power stimulates production and is therefore, conducive to a thriving
economy. However, creditors, who are unable to offset the "bad
debts" attending a consumer bankruptcy filing, suffer a direct loss in
earnings. An even more significant casualty of straight bankruptcy
is the consumer. Credit-oriented businessmen make the provision for
these "bad debts" by raising retail prices and finance charges, 40 thus
preserving their profit margin. These creditors do not lose money;
instead nonbankrupt consumers absorb the loss. Since solvent consumers must compensate for the prior "bad debts" of bankrupts, they
are constrained to allocate a greater portion of their income toward
purchases, the net effect being a redistribution of income. Because the
increase in demand stimulated by the bankrupt is probably insufficient
to offset the decrease in purchasing power suffered by other consumers, the existence of this alleged boon is questionable.

II.

THE CASE FOR CHAPTER

XIII

A. Illusory Advantages of StraightBankruptcy
The preceding economic discussion reveals the prospective vulnerability of the credit economy. Of more immediate concern, however,
89 However, some authorities suggest that the economy is adversely affected by
straight bankruptcy, Countryman, supra note 9, at 1456:
Perhaps the best way to measure the total impact of the bankruptcy discharge is to attempt to estimate the amount of unpaid balances discharged-a
figure not included in the official statistics. In nominal and no asset cases,
where nothing is paid to creditors and 98% of the bankrupts received discharges, liabilities have averaged $445,300,000 per year. Due allowance for
nondischargeable claims probably means that 95% of this amount, or
$423,000,000 per year, is covered by bankruptcy discharges. In 1962 liabilities
in such cases were $971,560,000 of which probably $923,000,000 was discharged.
In the asset cases, where 80% of the bankrupts received discharges, total
claims average $195,000,000 and unpaid balances average $160,000,000
per year. Probably 75% of this amount, or $120,000,000, is covered by
bankruptcy discharges. In 1962 unpaid balances were $223,000,000 of
which probably $167,000,000 was discharged.
In summary then, in all straight bankruptcy cases, an average of $50,677,000
per year is realized, of which an average of $35,474,000 is distributed to
creditors with total claims of $640,300,000. Total unpaid balances covered
by the bankruptcy discharge average $543,000,000 per year. In 1962, total
realization was $73,300,000, of which $52,400,000 was distributed to creditors
with claims totaling $1,246,000,000; about $1,190,000,000 was unpaid but
discharged (emphasis added).
1967 Hearings 3 where Congressman Poff of Virginia stated that: "Dollarwise, the
loss [caused by consumer bankruptcies], once counted in thousands, now runs into
hundreds of millions." Moreover, Mr. Carroll R. Wetzel, Chairman of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, testified:
The problem [of the increase in consumer bankruptcies] continues to be a
growing concern. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, it is anticipated
that . . .nearly $1,500,000,000 will be washed down the bankrupt drain
in no-asset bankrupt estates. Id. at 8.
40 Driver, supra note 38, at 42.
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is the relief available for the improvident recipients of consumer
credit. Only where the debtor's income is inadequate and attempted
repayment of liabilities futile, is straight bankruptcy a valuable
remedy4 1 Despite this limitation, many practicing attorneys and
referees, as well as theoretidans, 42 in suggesting that straight bankruptcy is beneficial to the debtor, cite three apparent advantages:
immediate discharge of debts; exclusive control of personal finances;
and low cost of relief.

1. Immediate Discharge
Straight bankruptcy results in an immediate discharge of many unsecured debts. On the other hand, the following exceptions substantially delimit the categories of dischargeable debts:4 3 payment of
Id. at 46. See Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 274-75.
San Diego Law Review Questionnaire; Interview with Professor William T.
Laube, University of California School of Law in Berkeley, Calif., Feb. 19, 1968
[hereinafter cited as Interview: Professor Laubel.
43 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1967):
§ 35. Debts not affected by a discharge.
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts. whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are
taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the
United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof within three years
preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however, That a discharge in bankruptcy
shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes (a) which were not assessed in
any case in which the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law, (b)
which were assessed within one year preceding bankruptcy in any case in
which the bankrupt failed to make a return required by law, (c) which were
not reported on a return made by the bankrupt and which were not assessed
prior to bankruptcy by reason of a prohibition on assessment pending the
exhaustion of administrative or iudicial remedies available to the bankrupt,
(d) with respect to which the bankrupt made a false or fraudulent return,
or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or defeat, or (e) which the
bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of
the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, but has not
paid over; but a discharge shall not be a bar to any remedies available under
applicable law to the United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof,
against the exemption of the bankrupt allowed by law and duly set apart to
him under this title: And provided further, That a discharge in bankruptcy
shall not release or affect any tax lien; (2) are liabilities for obtaining money
or property by false pretenses or false representations, or for obtaining money
or property on credit or obtaining an extension or renewal of credit in reliance
upon a materially false statement in writing respecting his financial condition
made or published or caused to be made or published in any manner whatsoever with intent to deceive, or for willful and malicious iniuries to the person
or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due or for maintenance or support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female,
or for breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation; (3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and
allowance, with the name of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless
such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; (4) were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or
defalcation while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity; (5) are for
wages which have been earned within three months before the date of commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy due to workmen, servants, clerks,
or traveling or city salesmen, on salary or commission basis, whole or parttime, whether or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt; or (6) are due for
moneys of an employee received or retained by this employer to secure the
41
42

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW[

[VOL. 5

taxes not more than three-years old; alimony and support payments;
unscheduled claims; and debts incurred as a result of a material false
statement on a credit application are nondischargeable. Moreover,
secured creditors, to the extent that their security interest is at least
equivalent to the debtor's liability, remain unaffected by a bankruptcy
adjudication." As a matter of practice, homes as well as automobiles,
refrigerators, stoves, and other durables subject to chattel mortgages
or conditional sales contracts are open to repossession. Yet, secured
creditors do not generally want used goods; they want money. Realizing that the resale value of the secured property may not equal the
payment due, the creditor may offer the debtor an opportunity to
avoid repossession by reaffirming the contract at a discount. When
those goods which the debtor deems "necessary" become vulnerable, there may be no discount. Regardless of the motivation for
reaffirmance, the result is inconsistent with the ostensible advantage of
straight bankruptcy-immediate discharge.
Supplementing the benefits of immediate discharge, exemption
statutes in several states45 allow debtors to protect certain assets from
consignment to the court for pro rata distribution to creditors.
These statutes protect only that property in which the debtor is
vested with complete and unencumbered title, and then only to a
limited extent. When the debtor's interest exceeds the amount statutorily protected, 8 there is a loss of personal and real property. Where,
instead, the value of the property is equivalent to or less than the exemption, the debtor would be induced to file a straight bankruptcy in
order to retain the exempted items. Because the debtor seldom holds
faithful performance by such employee of the terms of a contract of employ-

ment.
44 Id. § 96 (1964). Although the secured Creditor is protected against discharge of

the debtor's obligation, he may be "affected by the adjudication" in those jurisdictions
which do not allow for deficiency judgments unless the "fair market value" of his
interest is equivalent to the debt owed.
45 E.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 690-90.26 (West 1955) & CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE
§§ 690-690.27, 690.50-90.52 (West Supp. 1967). See also CAL. Civ. CODE § 1240
(West 1954) (Homestead Exemption); CoLo. REv. STAT. ch. 77, art. 1-8 (1963),
as amended, (Supp. 1967); Ky. REv. STAT. § 427.010 (1966).
46 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964). For an excellent discussion of
federal and state exemptions, see D. COWANS, supra note 31, at §§ 551-631.
47 Karp, Bankruptcy ... or Chapter XIII Plan?, 12 DICTA, Oct. 1965 (San Diego

County Bar Ass'n) at 6, 7-8. Compare Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the
Path to the Welfare State, 33 REF. J. 7, 8 (1959), where Referee Walker of the
Central District, California, states that: "state statutory exemptions furnish a strong

motivation against Chapter XIII" with Countryman, supra note 9, at 1455, where it is
observed that "[wie do know that state exemption laws are typically obsolete . . .
[which] will frequently mean that debtor retains little when his exemptions are set
apart in bankruptcy."
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full title, 48 these items are rarely exempt from attachment by the court.

Thus, the existence of the exemption statute, even where inappropriate, may cause the debtor to be misled in his choice of remedies.
In addition to legally secured claims, there are medical bills together with debts owed to friends, relatives, employers, and credit
unions, which are socially secured.4 9 Although legally dischargeable
as unsecured claims, these debts are frequently paid by the debtor
subsequent to discharge as a result of "community" pressure.
2. Exclusive Control
It is possible that once the debtor obtains a discharge, and is
adjudicated a bankrupt, he is free to spend his money as he wishes.
To the extent that he is relieved of his past financial burden, he is no
longer obliged to budget his income or impose emotional and physical
hardships on his family. Furthermore, he is not legally restricted in
the management of his personal finances nor constrained by the continual harassment of zealous creditors. Unfortunately, this independence is largely illusory. The measure of the debtor's freedom is

directly proportional to the sum of his dischargeable debts and the
number of previously secured debts which he is not compelled to
reaffirm.
3. Low Cost
Straight bankruptcy expenses may, at first, appear to be smalllimited to filing fees and attorneys' compensation. 0 However, this
analysis of bankruptcy costs is deceptive for it fails to take cognizance
of accompanying financial charges imposed upon the debtor. Because
bankruptcy does not relieve the debtor of his entire fiscal burden,
48 Interview with the Hon. Daniel R. Cowans, Referee in Bankruptcy, Northern
District, California, in San Jose, Calif., Feb. 19, 1968 [hereinafter referred to and
cited as Interview: Referee Cowans]. See Jacobs, Personal Bankruptcy a Class Problem
Sociologist Concludes, 19 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 111, 114 (1965):
Despite the lack of substantial equity held by most of the home owners
in the sample, it is still apparent that the chances are almost 3 to 1 that the
bankrupt is not a home owner, and when those with equities which are insignificant are taken into consideration, the chances that the bankrupt is not
a home owner (in a substantial sense) becomes better than 9 to 1. This
would appear to be significant.
49 Cowans, supra note 36, at 43.
G0 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 68(c)(1), 76(c), 80(a) (1964). The filing
fee for straight bankruptcy is $50.00, which accompanied by an affidavit of poverty can
be paid in installments. Id. § 68(c) (1) (1964).
For an interesting survey of "usual" attorneys' fees for straight bankruptcy see
Haden, Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plans-ForgottenMan Bankruptcy, 55 Ky. L.J.
564, 611 (1967).
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legally nondischargeable debts, for example, should be considered as
an additional expense. Moreover, reaffirmed secured contracts, and
repossessed necessities which must be replaced are encumbered with
interest charges. Similarly, socially secured debts will continue to add
to the debtor's post discharge expenditures. Accordingly, in order to
assess the aggregate cost of a bankruptcy discharge the initial fees
must be viewed in this larger perspective.
The foregoing analysis of the advantages of straight bankruptcy
should distinguish the real from the apparent. It should also be evident that straight bankruptcy is not a universal remedy, but rather, a
valuable, though limited form of relief for the debtor who cannot
pay his debts and is resigned to facing the stigma of bankruptcy, and
the possible loss of future credit standing. Employer concern regarding the prospective employees' financial stability is reflected by many
employment applications which require statements as to indebtedness
and prior bankruptcy. " The bankrupt may also lose self-respect since
only the most courageous or "callous person can approach bankruptcy without feeling"' 52 that he is about to avoid a moral or legal
obligation.
It is debatable, in a society geared to "deficit spending," whether
the stigma of bankruptcy is viable with respect to credit standing.
A Utah bankruptcy survey reveals that of the former bankrupts studied, "all" were able to obtain credit. 3 Moreover, some
consumer finance companies seek out the "new" bankrupt, who being
unable to file a subsequent
bankruptcy petition for six years, is a
"goo&' credit risk.54 However, with the exception of highly mobile
communities, credit standing may be a critical factor in the bankrupt's quandary. The stigma generates problems with banks, finance
companies, retailers, and other financial institutions who may not
extend credit to the bankrupt. 5 "His credit on major obligations is
likely to be determined by the amount of real security he can thereinafter offer." 56
51 Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 274.

It is interesting to note that the application for the California Bar Examination
under the heading of moral character requires information as to past bankruptcy

adjudication or insolvency. The Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of
California, Application for Examination for Admission to Practice Law, Question 21 d.
52

Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 274. See generally Bloom, Ready Help for

People in Debt, RaADER's DIGEST, June 1961, at 68-71.
53 Misbach, Personal Bankruptcy in the United States and Utah, 30 (1964).
54 Id.
5 Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 274.
56 Id.
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B. Benefits of Wage EarnerPlans
Arguably, straight bankruptcy creates as many problems for the
debtor as it solves. As an alternative, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act57 affords relief without being subject to many of the shortcomings
attending straight bankruptcy. An individual who files under a
Chapter XIII is referred to, and subsequently discharged as a debtor,
and not a bankrupt. 8 Not only does this enable the .debtor to escape
the emotional repercussions of the bankruptcy stigma, but it also
protects the debtor's future credit standing."' Although some authorities argue that the bankruptcy stigma attaches to a debtor under a
Wage Earner Plan,60 three distinguishing features are noteworthy.
First, by electing a Wage Earner Plan, the debtor makes no attempt
to avoid his present financial obligations. Second, creditors are more
likely to receive full or partial payment of debts. 1 Third, during the
course of a Chapter XIII plan, the debtor must adhere to a strict
budget, thereby avoiding the irresponsibility of money mismanagement associated with the stigma.
Besides reducing the stigma associated with insolvency, Wage
Earner Plans offer certain additional benefits to creditors and debtors.
(1) Since extension of credit is primarily governed by business
motives,0 2 creditors favor the eighty percent recovery rate obtainable
under Chapter XIII as opposed to the negligible straight bankruptcy
distribution. 3 During the operation of a Wage Earner Plan, court
approval, and subsequent incorporation into the plan, may be required of all credit purchases.6 Relying on this judicial "guarantee"
57

Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964).

Id. § 1006(3) (1964). Chapter XIII defines debtor as "[a] wage earner who
a petition under this Chapter."
L. TwinaM, supra note 15, at 11; Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 274.
Cowans, supra note 36 at 41; San Diego Law Review Questionnaire.
L. Twmna, supra note 15, at 9. See Countryman, supra note 9, at 1461.
62 Misbach, supra note 53; Interview with Mr. Harry Heid, Chapter XIII Trustee,
in San Diego, Calif., Feb. 8, 1968 [hereinafter referred to and cited as Interview:
Trustee Heid]; Countryman, supra note 9, at 1458-59.
03 L. TWINEm, supra note 15, at 9. See Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 273,
where it is stated that:
In the areas in which the use of Chapter XIII is widespread, the creditors
are getting nearly 100% of their accounts; whereas in straight bankruptcy
proceedings throughout the whole country less than 10% of the cases produce
anything at all for the creditors, and even in those cases only small dividends
are paid.
Professor Vem Countryman concludes The Bankruptcy Boom:
With an expectation of nothing in 87% of the straight bankruptcy proceedings and an expectation of 8% in the others, 95% under a wage earner plan
seems well worth waiting for. Countryman, supra note 9, at 1461.
64 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1058 (1964).
58

filed
59
60
61
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of payment, retailers have no reason to question the debtor's credit
standing. Having completed the plan and proved his ability and desire
to pay his debts, the former debtor should encounter little difficulty
in procuring credit.
(2) A debtor seeks bankruptcy relief from overburdening financial
pressures and for protection against harassing creditors.f Although
a bankrupt is subject to litigation on any nondischargeable debt, 0 a
Chapter XIII debtor is immune from legal action by creditors for the

duration of the plan.

7

Thus, the debtor can pay both dischargeable

and nondischargeable debts without incurring the additional expense

of defending lawsuits.
Because employers customarily fire employees upon receipt of a
third wage garnishment,68 debtors often attempt to procure job
insurance by filing straight bankruptcies." However, the debtor obtains court protection only until discharge after which he is again

"free game" for creditors. Since the court can bar wage attachments
based on claims filed both prior and subsequent to commencement of

the plan,7 0 adequate job protection can be furnished the debtor during
a Chapter XIII proceeding.
(3) Another equally important advantage of Wage Earner Plans
is the cessation of interest payments. Since the average insolvent is
obligated to pay twelve to sixteen creditors, the amount of interest
charged frequently is oppressive."' Under Chapter XIII, no interest
85 Siporin, A Study of Bankruptcy Court Debtors, 20 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q.
REP. 92 (1966); Driver, supra note 38, at 43-44.
60 Hilliard & Hurt, supra note 33, at 274.
67 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964).
68 M.S. Turner & R.A. Floren Jr., Employer and Union Wage Attachment Policies
in San Diego County, May 5, 1967 (unpublished thesis on file in the San Diego
Law Review Office, University of San Diego School of Law) at 2-3:
Seventy-one of the 72 firms with a policy, or 98.6% of firms reporting on
[employer practices relating to wage attachments] . .. give a warning on the
first wage attachment. On the second attachment, those willing to rely on a
warning dropped to 80.3%, and twelve firms or about 17% fired the employee. For a third attachment, 35 additional firms reported they would fire
the employee, which means that cumulatively 2 of employers would fire an
employee with as many as three wage attachments (emphasis added).
69 M.S. Turner & R.A. Floren Jr., supra note 68.
R.O. Hermon, Causal Factors in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Case Study, December,
1965 (unpublished thesis on file in the San Diego Law Review office, University of
San Diego School of Law); Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California, 53 CALIF. L.
REv. 1214, 1246 (1965). See Driver, supra note 38, at 43. See generally Larkin,
Statewide Consumer Credit Counseling Service Being Set-Up In California, 1.9
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 53, 54 (1965).
70 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1014 (1964).
71 DoLPHN,, supra note 36, at 131.
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is allowable on unsecured claims ;7 2 and in some jurisdictions, the
same restriction is applied to the unsecured portion of any secured
claim."3 This allows the debtor to allocate future earnings to payment on the principal of his debts, whereas a bankrupt, who must
use credit to reaffirm debts or repurchase necessities is once again
burdened with accruing interest charges over which he has no control.
(4) Chapter XIII affords the debtor an opportunity to stay repos-

sessions, retain non-exempt assets, and save property in which he has
equity greater than the maximum allowed by exemption statutes.
Wage Earner Plans provide for full payment of outstanding debts;
therefore, except for financial lenders holding assigned contracts

with a ninety day limitation on recourse, secured creditors have no
reason to initiate the costly process of repossession. However, the
bankrupt must submit all nonexempt assets to the trustee in bank-

ruptcy for pro rata distribution to creditors

4

Moreover, where the

debtor's interest exceeds the statutory exemption, he will lose the
property. On the other hand, if Chapter XIII is utilized, application
of the debtor's property to payment of liabilities is not required; the

only assets germane to the plan are future earnings.
(5) In contrast to the condition-riddled discharge available in
straight bankruptcy, there are no reaffirmed contracts, no legal or

social nondischargeable debts, or pending legal actions by creditors
to burden the former debtor. Therefore, a Chapter XIII debtor, who
has completed all scheduled payments is discharged of debts provided
for by the plan with the exception of those statutorily exempted 5
It should be made clear, however, that under an extension plan,
712See United States v. General Eng'r & Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1951).
The court construed Section 63(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act and held that after the
filing date on the debtor's petition, no interest will accrue on unsecured claims (Social
Security and withholding taxes in General Eng'r) in arrangement proceedings. This
limitation has been applied to Wage Earner Plans for two reasons: (1) the provisions
of Chapters I to VII (which include section 63(a) (1) are applicable to Chapter XIII
insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict therewith, and (2) if large corporations are exempted from interest payments, wage earners must be. In re Richardson, 34
REF. J. 60 (1960). See also Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966).
73 See J. Lee, Chapter XIII in Historical Perspective, 4 SEMINAR FOR NEWLY
APPOINTED REFEREEs IN BANKRUPTCY (1967); 52 REP., MAINE STATE BAR Ass'N
143-44. This procedure is apparently in effect in other jurisdictions although citable
authority is unavailable. The theory underlying this procedure is that the secured
creditor is only entitled to interest, and priority payments on that portion of the
secured debt equivalent to the value of the security. The difference between the value
of the security and the secured obligation is a deficiency which would have been lost
had the debtor filed a straight bankruptcy.
'14 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1964).
7r Id. §§ 1060-61.
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discharge results from full payment of debts, 78 whereas a composition
plan allows discharge only where failure to complete "payments was
due to circumstances for which he could not be justly held account77
able."
(6) Straight bankruptcy can be filed only once every six years;
therefore, if a debtor incurs financial difficulty subsequent to receiving
a discharge, protection of the court from garnishment, wage attachments, and general creditor harassment is not available except in the
form of a Chapter XIII extension plan. More importantly, initial
selection of a Wage Earner Plan does not prevent switching to a
straight bankruptcy nor does completion of an extension plan predude filing another Wage Earner Plan or a straight bankruptcy.
This manifest advantage was recently recognized by the United States
Supreme Court which ruled that the six-year bar to a second straight
bankruptcy filing was inapplicable to extension plans 8
(7) One of the necessary elements of the bankruptcy process is
rehabilitation.79 Indeed, consumer bankruptcy has reached critical
proportions because debtors are often ill-equipped to manage their
financial affairs. Straight bankruptcy, as an educational medium fails
to alleviate the problem. 0 Conversely, Chapter XIII proceedings contain several instructional devices. While living under a judicially
imposed budget the debtor learns to forego certain luxuries and to
undertake only those obligations which his financial resources will
allow. The viewpoint of one analyst who observed hundreds of
Chapter XIII cases is illuminating:
This program [Wage Earner Plan] also can help the debtor to
learn, possibly for the first time in his life, how to handle his
finances. Often the helpful pressure of the bankruptcy court is just
what is needed to assist the debtor in gaining the self-discipline
which is required. Such plans are not meant to be strict and harsh.
If unforeseen emergencies arise, the plans may be modified with
court approval.81
76

Id. § 1060.

Id. § 1061. See also id.§ 32(c)(5):
The court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has
.. in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior to the
date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been granted a discharge, or
had a composition or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage
earner's plan by way of composition confirmed under this title ....
78 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
79 D. CowAs, supra note 31, at § 1; C NADLER, supra note 8, at §§ 1-11.
80 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 48, at 115; Driver, supra note 38, at 42-43.
81 Misbach, supra note 53, at 36.

77
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(8) The differences between extension plans and composition
plans under Chapter XIII often influences the debtor's choice of
remedies. If a debtor can amortize his accrued liabilities within a
three-year period, the foregoing benefits will be available to him
through use of a Chapter XIII extension plan. Notwithstanding his
inability to complete an extension plan, a debtor, burdened with many
nondischargeable debts or debts likely to be reaffirmed after discharge,
may still benefit from use of a composition plan because it offers the
debtor the protection of the court, allows him to consolidate his debts,
and requires only single monthly payments. Consequently, Chapter
XIII provides a desirable form of relief. Straight bankruptcy should
not be filed whenever convenient; the remedy is valuable to the debtor
only in time of necessity. On the other hand, when a wage earner plan
is practical, its use preserves the remedy of straight bankruptcy for
a time when no other course of action is feasible.82
(9) Unfortunately, Chapter XIII is also encumbered with drawbacks, two being frequently mentioned. First, some attorneys and
referees feel that requiring a debtor to live on a stringent budget for
a three-year period greatly hinders the prospects for completion of a
plan.88 A plan should be feasible without resort to "poverty level"
budgeting.84 Accordingly, the amount allocated for payment to the
trustee should be inversely proportional to the ability to pay without
hardship. With respect to hardship, a family burdened with financial
restraints often may encounter marital problems.85 While lack of
harmony is immaterial to a straight bankruptcy action, success of a
Wage Earner Plan is dependent upon the motivation of both debtor
82 Interview with the Hon. Arlene Rossi, Referee in Bankruptcy, Southern District,
California, in San Diego, Calif., Feb. 26, 1968 [hereinafter referred to and cited as
Interview: Referee Rossi]. Referee Rossi remarked that use of a Chapter XIII, Wage

Earner Plan, when the debtor has only a small amount of debts will preserve the
remedy of straight bankruptcy for a day when needed. Bobier, Chapter XIII-Mecca
or Mirage, 32 THE DETROrr LAWYER 25, 26 (1964).
83 Cowans, supra note 36, at 43; San Diego Law Review Questionnaire; Interview:
Professor Laube.
84 See Dolphin, An Analysis of Economic and Personal Factors Leading to Consumer Bankruptcy (1965) (28% to 49% of all bankrupts in Genesse County,
Michigan could pay debts); Brosky, A Study of Personal Bankruptcy in the Seattle
Metropolitan Area (1965) (If 20% of bankrupt's monthly income applied to debts
39% of all Seattle bankrupts could pay debts; if 25% applied 56% could pay);
Misbach, Personal Bankruptcy in the United States and Utah (1964) (25% to 50% of
all Utah bankrupts could pay debts).
For a sample of studies which conclude that the causes of consumer bankruptcy
must be researched further before any conclusions can be made, see Stabler, The
Experience of Bankruptcy (1966); Brunner, Personal Bankruptcies in Ohio (1965);
Schaber, Voluntary Bankruptcy-A Growing Consumer Bankruptcy Problem (1959).
85 D. CowANs, supra note 31, at § 57.
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and spouse. The debtor must weigh the momentary hardship of a
Wage Earner Plan against the deleterious effects which follow a discharge in bankruptcy.
Second, it may appear that debtors, who are unable to complete
the scheduled payments, may lose all of the money paid to the trustee
if the Chapter XIII proceeding is dismissed.86 Most Chapter XIII
plans make provision for payment of secured before unsecured creditors.8 7 If the plan has not progressed beyond this stage the debtor, by

switching to straight bankruptcy, loses nothing. Payments made to
secured creditors will reduce the amount due on any contracts which
may have been reaffirmed. If secured creditors will not reaffirm but
insist on repossession, this loss must be counter-balanced by the debtor's use of these goods during the course of the plan. If the plan has
progressed to payment of unsecured creditors, the debtor will not
lose the accrued equity. Since secured creditors have already been
paid, there should be virtually no repossessions nor reaffirmed contracts to trouble the debtor. When unsecured debts have been partially paid, the debtor may appear to lose that sum since the debt
would not have been paid had he initially filed straight bankruptcy.
But, if the debtor becomes unable to complete payments, the court in
its discretion, may allow conversion of the extension plan to a composition plan giving the debtor the full benefit of the wage earner
process."8 Where there is no conversion, and straight bankruptcy is
filed, the debtor has at least made partial payment on a legal obligation, enjoyed the protection of the court against wage garnishments,
legal actions, and accruing interest on unsecured claims, and has also
been exposed to a form of rehabilitation.
If the disadvantages of Chapter XIII are contrasted with its many
benefits, and the benefits compared to the deficiencies of straight
bankruptcy, it should be evident that the debtor will fare far better
under a Wage Earner Plan.
III. LACK OF UTILIZATION

-Despite the many advantages of Wage Earner Plans, they are
dearly not in widespread use, and in fact, represent merely 17 percent of all the nonbusiness bankruptcies filed in 1967.89 Yet, even
86

San Diego Law Review Questionnaire;Interview: Professor taube.

87 Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1059(6) (1964).
88 Id. § 1061 (1964).
89 1967 BANKRUPTcy TABLEs, V-7 (table). Bankruptcy filings charted indicate

that of 208,329 petitions filed in the district courts, 31,963 were Chapter XIII filings or
less than 17o.
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this percentage is misleading. Disregarding the filings in Alabama,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, Wage Earner Plans represent only 91/ percent of the remaining nonbusiness bankruptdes 0°
This figure becomes more significant when compared to the findings
of several recent studies which indicate that 25 to 50 percent of recent
bankrupts were capable of paying their entire debts out of future
earnings. 91 Numerous other surveys have explored this problem but
have seemingly failed to reach the same conclusions. 2 Even if the
more optimistic survey results are somewhat exaggerated, it is apparent that a higher percentage of Wage Earner Plans could be utilized.
It is further contended that the use of a Chapter XIII should not be
limited to any one sector of the country,9 3 but rather should depend
upon the ability of each debtor to divert a percentage of his future
earnings to the liquidation of accrued liabilities. A successful Chapter
XIII program is contingent upon the existence of four additional
criteria:
(1) Effective control over secured creditors;

(2) Recognition of the outstanding benefits of such proceedings
to debtors, creditors, and the community in general;
(3) Simplification of work for the attorneys representing the
debtor; and
(4) Sound and efficient administration after confirmation, geared
to effect voluntary compliance by the debtor. 4
In order to demonstrate the benefits of this procedure, it is necessary
to contrast this "formula' for success with the causes for lack of use.
So many attorneys have been influenced by arguments setting forth
90 1967 BANKrUPTCY TABLES, table F-2. The number of Chapter XIII filings of
the five states, 17,371, and the total number of nonbusiness filings were respectively
deducted from the total Chapter XIII and nonbusiness filings for all districts, and the
percentage was then computed.
91 See Dolphin, supra note 84, at 1-40; Brosky, supra note 84; Misbach, supra note
53.
92 See 1967 Hearings 73. Professor Ven Countryman drew this conclusion from a
study of the following surveys: Stabler, The Experience of Bankruptcy (1966);
Juiobi, The Family in Financial Crisis (1965); Schaber, Voluntary Bankruptcy-A
Growing Consumer Bankruptcy Problem (1959).
93 1967 BANKRUPTCY TABLES, table F-2. The figures for 1967 indicate that
Chapter XIII represents more than 25% of all nonbusiness filings in only seven
states; Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, and Tennessee, where
it is being extensively used. In eighteen states, Chapter XIII represented less than
5% of all nonbusiness filings in 1967, and in eleven of these same states there were
fewer than fifteen Chapter XIII filings. In ten states, in which there were 2,632 nonbusiness filings, a combined total of ten Wage Earner Plans were filed.
94 52 REP., MArAE STATE BAR ASs N 137 (1963). For convenience of this discussion,
the order of the criteria has been rearranged.
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the advantages of straight bankruptcy that Chapter XIII has been
almost completely ignored. Contributing to a distorted understanding
of the true benefits of Chapter XIII are the following: (1) the exemption inducement to file straight bankruptcy; 5 (2) the six-year refiling
bar subsequent to completion of a composition plan; °1 and (3) the
misleading notion that Wage Earner Plans result in loss of prior
payments.97 Four additional factors are responsible for lack of
Chapter XIII use.
First, one of the major hurdles to be overcome before the referee
can approve a Chapter XIII plan is the unanimous assent required of
secured creditors dealt with by the plan.08 A creditor dealt with by the
plan means one who is adversely affected by it; that is, payment to
the secured creditors under a Wage Earner Plan may be smaller and
more protracted than had the plan not been approved. Undoubtedly,
many attorneys reason that most secured creditors may indeed be
unfavorably affected by the plan and consequently will file a rejection.
Where the deficiency on the secured creditor's claim is minimal, this
assessment may be accurate because the creditors would be able to
obtain full payment immediately by foreclosing on the security. Since
it is not uncommon for secured debts to comprise half of the debtor's
obligations, 9 the task of obtaining consent may influence the attorney
to file a straight bankruptcy.
However, two recent decisions have restricted the ability of the
secured creditor to defeat the plan. Cheetham v. Universal C..T.
Credit Corp.100 signals a major change in the law. The court avoided
application of the elusive term "adversely affected" by holding that
"secured claims are dealt with only when the plan expressly limits
95 See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
96 See text accompanying note 78 supra.

97 See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
98 Bankruptcy Act, ii U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1964). In Cheetham v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234 (1st Cir. 1968), the court found that "dealt

with" is synonymous with "affected" as defined in Section 607 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11

U.S.C. § 1007 (1964), which provides that "[a] creditor shall be deemed tobe 'affected'
by a plan only if his interest shall be materially and adversely affected thereby." See also
Haden, supra note 50, at 573-75.
99 See Misbach, supra note 53, at 25. The Utah survey indicated that $509,980

of debtors' total obligation of $827,269 were secured. Referees and trustees have also
indicated that more than half of the debtors' obligations are secured. Interview with
the Hon. Louis Karp, Southern District, California, in San Diego, Calif., Feb. 1, 1968

[hereinafter referred to and cited as Interview: Referee Karp]; Interview with Mr.
William Martin, Chapter XIII Trustee, in Los Angeles, Calif., Feb. 16, 1968 [herein-

after referred to and cited as Interview: Trustee Martin]; Interview: Referee Cowans;
Interview; Trustee Heid.
100 390 F.2d 234 (1st Cir. 1968).
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the amount recoverable on the claim, or restricts the creditor's security
interest."' 0'1 If neither occurs, then the secured creditor is not "dealt
with" by the plan and his assent is immaterial." 2
Furthermore, if the plan does not restrict the creditor's security
interest, and he subsequently decides to foreclose on the secured item,
the bankruptcy court "has power upon notice and for cause shown
to enjoin or stay until final decree any action to enforce liens upon
the property of the debtor."' 03 In Hallenbeck v.Penn. Mutual Life
Insurance Company, 0 4 the Circuit Court of Appeals held that this
power may be exercised where:
(1) The injunction or stay must be necessary to preserve the debtor's
estate or to carry out the Chapter XIII plan; (2) the granting of the
injunction must not directly or indirectly impair the security of the
lien; and (3) the owner of the secured indebtedness must not be
required to accept less than the full periodic payments specified in
his contract. 10 5

Therefore, to eliminate the once formidable barrier which required
the secured creditor's consent, a debtor need only construct a plan
which accommodates the ruling in Cheetham.
Second, since a spouse is not subject to the order of the court in a
Chapter XIII proceeding,0 6 she is free to incur additional financial
obligations and thus, add to the debtor's burden. If there is matrimonial discord, the chances for completion of the plan are substantially reduced and it may be advisable for the debtor to file a straight
bankruptcy. However, there is a proposed bill before Congress which
will enable the spouses to file a joint petition in a Chapter XIII
proceeding.0 7 This may alleviate some of the debtor's worries while
he is completing a Wage Earner Plan. On the other hand, this proposal may be a futile attempt to legislate marital harmony.
Third, the most salient reason for this lack of use is ignorance of
an alternative to straight bankruptcy amongst the creditor and debtor
community, as well as in the legal profession. 0 8 Because many referees feel that Chapter XIII imposes an administrative burden on the
101 Id. at 238.
102 Id.
103

104

Hallenbeck v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).

Id.

1o5 Id. at 572.
106 D. CowANs,

supra note 31, at § 101.

107 H.R. 4992, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
108 Misbach, supra note 53, at 37. See also Haden, supra note 50, at 601-03.
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courts, they have never troubled to investigate the possibilities of
developing a systematic wage earner procedure. 1 9 To a certain extent,
this judicial attitude may be attributed to the erroneous belief that
straight bankruptcy is a debtor's panacea. And this belief can also
be ascribed to inadequate knowledge. If referees were more knowledgeable as to Wage Earner Plans, the number of Chapter XIII filings
would reflect this judicial awakening.
Fourth, much of the ignorance imputed to attorneys pertains to the
advantages and functioning of a Wage Earner Plan. However, the
prevalence of bankruptcy actions would seem to impose a duty"10
on lawyers to obtain a thorough grounding in the legal remedies
available to a distressed debtor.
Among those familiar with Wage Earner Plans, it is generally
agreed that a Chapter XIII creates substantially more work for the
attorney"' than a straight bankruptcy." This disparity is significant
in view of the nearly identical fees charged by attorneys for both
remedies. Furthermore, in straight bankruptcy cases, attorneys enjoy
a payment status in preference to both secured and unsecured creditors," while under a Chapter XIII, the attorney's fee is generally
prorated over a period of time with other secured debts.,"4 It seems
likely that an attorney may allow this disparity to influence his judgment.
109 Chandler, The Wage Earner Plan: Ifs Purpose, 15

VAND.

L. REv. 169, 170

(1961). Although Congressman Chandler's comment was intended as a causal factor
for the initial unpopularity of Wage Earner Plans, the argument seems appropriately
applicable to sectors which have never developed a Wage Earner procedure. See also

1967 Hearings40 (Statement of Mr. Twinem).
110 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETaics No. 15. "The lawyer owes 'entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,' to the end that nothing
be taken or be withheld from him ...." Id.
III San Diego Law Review Questionnaire. Better than sixty percent of the returned

questionnaires indicated that a Wage Earner Plan involves substantialy more work for
the attorney. Except for a few isolated jurisdictions like Maine (discussed infra),
most districts require the attorney to prepare and administer the plan, obtain the
required consent of creditors, and handle the client's problems during the operation
of the plan.

112 See note 111 supra. Unlike those procedures, straight bankruptcy merely requires the attorney to prepare a schedule of assets and liabilities, deposit the fees, and

file the petition for a discharge.
113 Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 104(a) (1) (1964).
114 Although Section 1059 of the Bankruptcy Act provides for priority payment to
attorneys in a Chapter XIII proceeding, at least one San Diego attorney, Nelson
Millsberg, indicated that he prorates his fee with other creditors in order to allow
quicker payments to creditors. The sooner the debtor's future earnings are applied to
payment of past liabilities, he will be more induced to continue the necessary payments
scheduled under the plan. Interview with Mr. Nelson Millsberg, Attorney at Law, in
San Diego, Calif., Feb. 7, 1968.
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If courts and trustees can relieve attorneys of much of this work,

Chapter XIII filings will enjoy considerably more success."

5

It is

obvious that this method is preferable to raising attorneys' fees,
which would impose a greater burden on the debtor and probably
discourage Chapter XIII filings. The system developed by Referee
Richard E.Poulos of the Southern District of Maine is worthy of
attention because he succeeded in administering Wage Earner Plans
without coercion while placing heavy emphasis on voluntary debtor
action." 6 In Maine, "once a plan has been accepted [by the referee],

the appointed trustee fully controls the administrationof the proceeding and, is constantly available for advice, if needed."" T Referee
Poulos set forth the procedure in an address to the Maine Bar:
As a practical matter, therefore, the attorney representing the
debtor merely initiates the proceeding and rarely thereafter is he
called upon to render additional services. In presenting such proceedings, the following steps are generally followed: (1) interview
the debtor to ascertain the essential facts; (2) prepare an original
and three copies of the petition an standard forms; three sets of
schedules, statement of affairs and statement of debtor's executory
contracts; (3) file such documents along with a proposed plan...
and (4) attend the first meeting of creditors." 8
In effect, the attorney does little more than he normally would when
filing a straight bankruptcy. His fees under the Maine system would
be smaller, 1 9 but the service rendered, greater. Perhaps, the most
important aspect of the Maine procedure relegates either to the
trustee120 for Wage Earner Plans or to the court the burdens of
resolving disputed claims and dealing with secured creditors. 2 ' Since
debts are not generally proved and allowed until after confirmation
of the plan, 22 obtaining acceptances from unsecured creditors never
poses a problem for the debtor's attorney. As Referee Poulos observed,
115 1967 Hearings 92. Referee Poulos noted that simplification of the attorney's
work largely contributed to the success of Wage Earner Plans in Maine, particularly
in view of the method indicated by his statement, "EW]e try to leave it [selection of
a Chapter XIII proceeding] entirely on a voluntary basis."
116 1967 Hearings 85-96. Only a perusal of Referee Poulos' testimony is necessary
to glean this conclusion about the Chapter XIII procedures in his district.
117 52 REP., MAINE STATE BAR Ass'N 141.
18 Id.

119 Compare 1967 Hearings 88 (Statement by Referee Poulos) with Haden, supra
note 50, at 611. A brief survey of the corresponding fees for Wage Earner Plans and
straight bankruptcies indicates that most states allow attorneys' fees between $150-$200
for a Chapter XIII filing.
120 52 REP., MWNE STATE BAR Ass'N 141.
121 In re Perry, 272 F. Supp. 73, 91 (S.D. Me. 1967).
122 52 REP., MLUNa STATE BAR AW5'N 141.
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[I] t has been my experience that initiating straight bankruptcy proceedings is generally one of the worst mistakes an individual can
make because, as many of us know, such persons end up owing
nearly as much money after bankruptcy as they did before bankruptcy.123
Concern for the debtor prompted the developments in Maine.
Chapter XIII was designed to provide a service to insolvent wage
earners. While most of the nation has been slow to act, Maine has
taken a significant step towards effecting the initial purpose of this
legislation. Although implementation of this procedure may deprive
many attorneys of a substantial part of their practice, failure of the
legal profession to make this remedy available to the lay community
may necessitate congressional action in order to provide the proper
mechanism to encourage use of Chapter XIII.
IV. OTHER PROPOSALS

The adequacy of present legal remedies under the Bankruptcy Act
has been the subject of recent controversy. Some authorities believe
that consumer bankruptcy has been, and others that it will become, a.
major problem and that revision of the Bankruptcy Act is the only
solution. 124 Three recent proposals are worthy of mention: (a)
amending Chapter XIII by conferring upon the referee discretionary
power to refuse the issuance of a discharge where a Wage Earner
Plan is feasible; (b) adapting the British and Canadian program of
granting conditional discharges in bankruptcy; and (c) revising the
Bankruptcy Act to provide a system of rehabilitation and counseling

under the auspices of the court.
A. ProposedDiscretionaryPower of Referee
The most controversial, and apparently the most frequently mentioned alternative to the status quo is House Resolution 1057,125
otherwise known as 'involuntary" or "compulsory" Chapter XIII.
Sponsored by the Consumer Bankruptcy Committee of the American
Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law, 28 the bill requires the referee to refuse any petition for a bankruptcy discharge where the petitioner fails to prove that he is unable
Id. at 136.
See 1967 Hearings 75, 89, 122 (Recommendations of Prof. Countryman,
Referee Poulos, and Mr. Twinem); Cowans, supra note 36, at 43.
121 H.R. 1057, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
128 1967 Hearings 121.
12
14
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to obtain "adequate relief" under Chapter XIII. 2 7 The proponents of
this legislation are genuinely concerned with the increase in consumer
bankruptcies and its detrimental effect on the public. Creditors who
unsentimentally support Wage Earner Plans are disturbed by its
limited utilization which is in contrast to the rise in bankruptcy filings.
As previously noted, numerous referees and attorneys are disenchanted with Chapter XIII. Adoption of this amendment will provide the desired implementation since all referees will then be
statutorily required to "encourage" use of Chapter XIII plans.'
Unquestionably, the strongest argument for enacting the proposed
legislation is voiced by Mr. Linn K. Twinem,2 9 Chairman of the
ABA Committee. Mr. Twinem argues that the right to receive a
discharge in straight bankruptcy is neither socially nor economically
sound, since the consumer, who receives credit in good faith, has a
responsibility to pay his obligations if able to do so.'
In answer to criticism that this legislation would make Wage
Earner Plans compulsory and would place debtors under the harsh
yoke of the court for the duration of the plan, the proponents contend that debtors are in no way coerced into a Chapter XIII but are
3
only denied the protection of the court via bankruptcy proceedings.1 1
This would be true if the term "compulsory" were literally applied.
In practice, particularly where states have liberal garnishment statutes,
the debtor would have no meaningful alternative to filing a Chapter
XIII182 During Mr. Twinem's testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Congressman Jacobs ' s of
Indiana analogized the situation when he said:
[A] man who is under a garnishee order and who needs some sort
of relief, is a little bit like the fellow who is terribly thirsty, and is
shown two cans of water, one with mud in it and the other dear,
his problem, but
and told that he can do whatever he wants about
1s4
he cannot drink from the can of dear water.
Others have been even more vehement in their criticism. Briefly,
Id. at 2.
1967 Hearings 85.
Mvir. Twinem is the Chairman, Consumer Bankruptcy Comm'n of the ABA,
Editor, Personal Finance L.Q. Rep., General Counsel, Beneficial Finance Corp., and
author, Guide to Wage Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.
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they argue that the amendment, as proposed, is ambiguous. The
standard of "adequate relief" would reflect the particular prejudices
of the referee who would be required to adjudicate the matter and,
therefore, suffer from the same lack of uniformity that the proponents
allege to be one of the shortcomings of the current Chapter XIII.1'1
A second criticism points out that where creditors have initiated
the bankruptcy petition, debtors could easily avoid the creditor's
action by virtue of a "do nothing" defense. That is, the debtor may
refuse to show why he could not obtain "adequate relief" under a
Chapter XIII and the referee would be compelled to dismiss the
proceedings.136 This would render nugatory the right of creditors to
commence an involuntary bankruptcy petition.
Several authorities question the constitutionality of the proposal
because it subjects only wage earners to the discretion of the court as
a precondition to receiving a discharge. 17 By denying the benefits of
a discharge solely to wage earners as opposed to professionals, corporations, and nonsalaried individuals, application of the amendment
would result in unconstitutional class legislation.1 38 Though such

arguments are undoubtedly valid, the proposal could be redrafted to
meet this criticism. However, House Resolution 1057 must fail because of the following inherent defect. The success of Wage Earner
Plans depends substantially on the willingness of the debtor to undertake the program. If the voluntary element were removed from
Chapter XIII, the chances for completion would be virtually nil. 1 0
Furthermore, requiring a debtor to elect a Wage Earner Plan against
his will, as the only means of obtaining judicial protection, "is
contrary to the genius of our institutions."' 140
Extensive research and numerous interviews have revealed that,
generally, House Resolution 1057 is advocated by businessmen and
attorneys representing the creditor community since more money is
repaid to creditors under a Chapter XIII than under straight bank135 Comment, The Problem of Consumer Bankruptcy: Is Amendment of the Bank.
ruptcy Act the Answer?, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1449, 1455 (1965).
136 Comment, Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Be Involuntary, 44 TEXAS L. REv.
533, 541 (1966).
137 1967 Hearings 9, 74 (Statement of Royal E. Jackson, Chief of the Bankruptcy
Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts; and statement of Prof.
Countryman).
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., 1967 Hearings 11, 51, 74, 92, 124 (Statements of Mr. Jackson,
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Judge, United States District for Kansas, Prof. Country.

man, Referee Poulos, Mr. Twinem).
140 1967 Hearings.
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ruptcy.141 Even if a wage earner does not complete all payments,
initiating a Chapter XIII is still more beneficial to creditors.142 However, referees and trustees, who daily observe debtors, seem uniformly
convinced that only a voluntary Wage Earner Plan is practicable 1 43

B. ConditionalDischarge
A second alternative, somewhat analogous to an involuntary Wage
Earner Plan, is the conditional discharge now utilized in Canada1 4
and England. 45 This analysis will be limited to the discharge feature,
which, in part, distinguishes British from American procedures. 4"
Under the British system the debtor: (1) files a statement that he1 is
49
48
unable to pay his debts; 147 and (2) is issued' a Receiving Order,'
and then adjudicated a bankrupt. 1 0 Following such an adjudication,
the debtor must file for a discharge.15 1 The procedure which he must
pursue to obtain that discharge is designed to discourage the debtor
from fulfilling the statutory requirements for complete relief. 52
If the debtor has provable debts not satisfied at the time of the hearing,153 the court either refuses or suspends the discharge. Such debts
must be paid out of future earnings or after-acquired property. 54
Commenting on the British system, Professor MacLachlan 55 observed:
If the court feels that the creditors have suffered unduly, even in
cases where the bankrupt has been guilty of no serious dereliction,
See material cited note 6 supra.
142 See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
143 See material cited note 139 supra.
144 CAN.REV. STAT. c. 14 (1952).
145 Bankruptcy Act of 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59 [hereinafter cited as Act].
146 Joslin, Bankruptcy: Anglo-American Contracts, 29 MODERN L. REv. 149, 154
(1966). Professor Joslin indicates three basic areas of difference: (1) The property
administered in bankruptcy; (2) the exemption provisions; and (3) the discharge
features.
147 Act, § 6.
148 Id. § 5(2). The court conducts a hearing at which time it determines whether
facts have been shown justifying a bankruptcy. The debtor comes under the protection
of the court, the order is published in the London Gazette, and the debtor is given
an opportunity to clear himself before a bankruptcy adjudication ensues. Joslin,
English Bankruptcy, 40 TuL. L. REv. 289, 293-94 (1966).
149 "Receiving Orders" in England are tantamount to a petition in bankruptcy in
the United States.
141

160 Act § 16(16).
151 Id. § 26(1).

152 See Joslin, supra note 148, at 303-08.
153 Act § 26(2) (iv).
14 Id.
155 The late James Angell Macachlan, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School;
author, HADBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY.
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there may be a basis for using discretion to enforce what seems to
the court as a better balance of inconvenience or detriment as between the creditors on the one hand and the bankrupt on the
other. 156

Conditional discharge takes especial cognizance of the creditor's rights
and emphasizes distribution of present and future assets rather than
providing the debtor with alternative remedies. 5 7 Justification for

maintaining this system may be attributed to the large volume of
mercantile bankruptcies filed in England, 8s which differs materially
from the predominance of consumer bankruptcy in the United States.
Even without the harsh procedures which dominate the British
system, and despite the favorable support from creditors, conditional
discharges would still be subject to the same deficiencies mentioned
previously in respect to involuntary Wage Earner Plans.

C. Court Sponsored Rehabilitation

Referee Danial H. Cowans suggests that not only the present
system but also involuntary Wage Earner Plans, are inadequate to
deal with the major problems of consumer bankruptcy. 1 9 Although
the current number of bankruptcies poses no immediate economic
threat, some experts fear that bankruptcy may become popular. 100
Cowans argues that existing precedures do not provide the requisite
rehabilitation for the debtor who is ill-equipped to face the complexities of the "credit economy." While a potential bankrupt may
attribute his plight to poor money management, his difficulties stem
not so much from his dereliction as from his lack of sophistication.' 1
Furthermore, rehabilitation advice may not be available from his
158 J.A. MAcLAcHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRuPTcY 113 (1956).
Joslin, supra note 146, at 150.
158 Id. at 149 n.4, 151-52. Ninety-two percent of the Receiving Orders in 1963
were filed by small merchants, contractors, and the trader class. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the economic and social policy of the Commonwealth stresses distribution to creditors. Professor Joslin suggests that as personal bankruptcies increase in
England, Great Britain's bankruptcy laws may need revision to reflect greater concern
for the debtor's welfare.
159 Cowans, Present Bankruptcy Act Defective Changes Currently Proposed are
UnsuitablePor Dealing With Insolvent Individuals New Solution Advocated, Including
Credit Counseling, 22 PERSONAL FniANcE L.Q. REP. 40 (1968).
160 Id. at 41. "tIlf bankruptcy ever becomes popular, then 1929 will be very mild
by comparison." After analyzing the bankruptcy-population ratio and concluding that
it does not cause him great concern, Referee Cowans continues:
The fact that as I look over the filings I see other members of a family file if
one does or other employees of the same company file after the pioneering one
does, concerns me a great deal. It is easy to see the possible progression to the
point of popularity. Id.
11 Id. at 42.
157
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attorney who frequently is unfamiliar with the art of financial
planning. 1 2 Unless society educates the debtor about money management, he is likely, once again, to plunge into financial doldrums
immediately after obtaining a bankruptcy discharge. Accordingly,
Referee Cowans believes that, as a prerequisite to securing judicial relief, a debtor should be subjected, for his own benefit,
to a rehabilitation program, administered under the auspices of the
court."3 He suggests that the courts sponsor a credit counseling and
budgeting program, utilizing professionally trained personnel to
isolate the source of the debtor's troubles and provide him with
armor to protect himself against future insolvency problems.'
Referee Cowans has recommended the following procedural revisions: the debtor would initially file a petition for relief without
specifying the desired remedy, and restraining orders would be immediately available. Both debtor and attorney would then be required to submit to a court directed examination procedure, at
which time court-appointed credit and budget counselors would
explain the feasible forms of relief. After considering the advice,
the debtor would choose between a Wage Earner Plan and straight
bankruptcy. Additionally, if the debtor elected to file under a Chapter
XIII, the court-appointed counselors would be available to assist
his attorney in dealing with the myriad difficulties which may arise
while administering a Wage Earner Plan. 5
Referee Cowans has indicated that classroom instruction for the
debtor at the time of filing would be appropriate 66 in view of the
extraordinary relief which the court has power to grant. Revamping
the bankruptcy process to incorporate such a supplementary procedure
would substantially aid the debtor, although organization may prove
difficult and cost of administration, prohibitive. Private credit counseling services have been experiencing this very problem, although a few
have enjoyed success in large urban communities.16T Despite the
possibility that private enterprise could effectuate a less expensive
procedure without the usual administrative "red tape," its lack of the
enforcement power necessary to compel consumer counseling would
pose inherent defect.
102
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In response to foreseeable criticism that Referee Cowans' proposal
is but another instance of the welfare state, it is sufficient to note
that the immediate objective of this program is to equip the debtor
with the know-how to compete within the "credit economy." The
benefits would then accrue to creditor and debtor alike."6 8
Consumer education should begin at the grammar school level.'
Since many state education acts presently have provisions which
require mandatory instruction in other practical subjects, 70 those acts
might be amended to include, within the required curriculum, a
course in personal finance management, which would reduce the
naivete of future consumers.
V.

CONCLUSION

In view of the manifest advantages of Wage Earner Plans, substantially more Chapter XIII proceedings should be initiated. Concomitantly, court sponsored rehabilitation would furnish debtors an
opportunity to learn responsible money management. Under present
conditions, the burden on attorneys would frustrate the purpose of
such bankruptcy legislation by denying the distressed wage earner
suitable relief. Shifting the workload to courts and trustees may
prove to be the most desirable Chapter XIII procedure. Maine has
accomplished this; so should the Nation.
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168 Id. at 44, 47.

169 Id. at 47.
170 See, e.g., CAL. EDuC. CODE § 7901, as amended, (West Supp. 1967); OKLA.
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